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This paper describes a new conceptual framework to facilitate the resilience analysis of maritime container transport 
networks, by taking into consideration both local risk estimations of container shipping hazards and their global 
impacts on the overall safety performance of the whole transportation network.  In the proposed framework, a series 
of risk assessment techniques (e.g. Fuzzy and Bayesian networks), are applied to provide a flexible way for 
transforming risk input information into the evaluations of individual risk factors; and network centrality measures 
are used to determine the vulnerability of each container shipping route within the network. Furthermore, the 
evidential reasoning (ER) algorithm is used to aggregate the risk estimations of container shipping operations and 
importance of container shipping routes in a whole network collectively. Several extreme risk scenarios are set to 
measure the influence of risk conditions of different container shipping routes on the overall safety performance of 
the entire network, and the rationality and feasibility of the method are validated by using numerical case studies. 
The novel framework proposed in this research supports dynamic risk-based resilience analysis of maritime 
container transport networks. It provides a paradigm shift of resilience analysis by the integration of local level risk 
analysis of components and global level risk impacts of components to complex networks. It provides the solutions 
to rationalizing safety resources between the low prioritized hazards of the nodes of high safety impact and the high-
risk hazards of the nodes of low safety impact in complex transportation networks in a quantitative manner.    
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In the last several decades, increasing volume of 
international trade, fast development of 
transportation infrastructure, and ever-changing 
technology innovation facilitate transport 
containerization worldwide. However, the growth 
in globalization and complexity of maritime 
container transportation systems also brings 
uncertainties which render high risk for safe and 
efficient operations. In the past decade, maritime 
container supply chain risks caused the loss of 
billions of dollars in the European Union (EU) 
alone, and the number of accidents and severity of 
the consequences are growing fast. Safety is one 
of the issues with great importance in maritime 
transportation research. However, its foci have 
been expanded from traditional risk through 
security, to resilience and sustainability. The 
involvement of resilience provides a new angle on 
the risk management of maritime transportation, 
and thus it attracts considerable interests from 
both researchers and practitioners across different 
research domains (Wan et al., 2017).  
Regarding the resilience analysis of a 
transportation network, one most commonly used 
method is to compare the variation of certain 
indexes related to the network performance before 
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and after the removal of some nodes/links (Kim, 
Chen and Linderman, 2015; Zhen et al., 2016). In 
the maritime container shipping industry, the 
removal of a node implies the shutdown of a port, 
and the removal of a link can be regarded as the 
changing of service configurations of a shipping 
company (Viljoen and Joubert, 2016).  
In previous studies, disruptions of a transportation 
network are initially divided into random 
disruptions and targeted ones. Random 
disruptions imply the removal of the components 
(nodes or links) of a transportation network in a 
random manner, which may be caused by, for 
example, natural disasters (such as hurricane and 
earthquake) and unexpected accidents (such as the 
explosion that temporarily shut down two 
container terminals at the port of Tianjin, China 
(Wan et al., 2018). While targeted disruptions 
(e.g., deliberate attacks) will prioritize the 
removal of the components following a special 
strategy such as removing nodes in the order of 
node degree, link betweenness, and link salience 
(Viljoen and Joubert, 2016), in order to cause as 
much damage as possible. However, both ways 
cannot fully reflect the real situation in practice, 
which can be regarded as two special cases.  
In practice, the occurrence of a disruption usually 
relates to the risk condition of a transportation 
network. In other words, a disruption is more 
likely to occur in the section of a transportation 
system with a higher risk level. However, it is 
worth noting that a higher likelihood of disruption 
does not necessarily indicate a higher impact on 
the whole transportation system, as the impact of 
disruption also depends on the specific role it 
plays in the whole system. 
In view of the above debate, this work aims to 
develop an integrated approach for analyzing the 
resilience of maritime container transport 
networks (MCTNs), considering both the risk 
level of container shipping operations and the 
relative importance of each shipping route within 
MCTNs, in order to achieve a paradigm shift on 
resilience analysis of complex networks such as 
MCTNs. In order to accomplish the above aim, 
this work is organized as follows. Section 2 
introduces the framework of MCTN resilience 
analysis, research steps, and major methods used 
in this work. A numerical case study based on a 
world-leading container shipping company is 
conducted to demonstrate the feasibility of the 
proposed method in Section 3. Finally, this work 
is concluded in Section 4. 
2. Methodology  
2.1 Research framework 
The proposed framework for analyzing the 
resilience of MCTNs consists of three major 
components, which outline all the necessary steps 
required, as shown in Fig 1. It can be seen that the 
methodological view on resilience analysis 
adopted in this work is originated from two 
streams. On the one hand, a series of risk models 
are generated to support the risk factor 
identification, risk analysis, and assessment of 
risk levels of container shipping operations, while 
on the other hand, a network-based approach is 
developed to calculate the centrality of ports, and 
measure the relative importance of each shipping 
routes within the MCTN from a physical structure 
perspective. The two streams are merged together 
to quantify the operational performance of 
MCTNs. In this study, the resilience of MCTNs is 
measured according to the drop of the operational 
efficiency of the investigated networks with 
respect to the increased risk levels of container 
shipping routes. It is worth noting that although 
the resilience of a transportation system exists in 
the whole process when a disruptive event occurs 
(e.g. pre-disaster, during a disaster, and post-
disaster), this study mainly considers the stage 
during a disruption with focuses on the abilities to 
withstand and survive in the face of disruptive 
events. 
Three main research steps to support the 
resilience analysis of MCTNs are listed as 
follows: 
Step 1. Modelling of the topological structure 
of MCTNs.  
Step 2. Quantify the operational performance 
of MCTNs (this step is further conducted from 
two aspects, which are: 
· Risk assessment of container shipping 
operations. 
· Importance measurement of container 
shipping routes. 
      Step 3. Evaluate the resilience of MCTNs 
through sensitivity analysis. 
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Fig. 1. The framework of MCTN resilience analysis. 
 
2.2 Construction of MCTNs 
Due to the fact that a highly interconnected global 
maritime container transportation system 
functions with all the features and characteristics 
of a typical network, it is often abstracted to a 
graph, in which container ports are viewed as the 
nodes and liner shipping services as the arcs 
within the network. Therefore, an MCTN 
provides an excellent fundamental basis for 
analyzing its structure by using a complex 
network approach. In this chapter, an MCTN is 
abstracted as a connected network G = (V, E) by 
V and E, where V = {vi: i=1, 2,…, n}, n is the 
number of nodes (ports), while E = {ei: i=1, 2,…, 
m}, m is the number of arcs (links between ports). 
To represent a network, an adjacency matrix An×n 
is created where an element aij = 1 when a 
container liner service exists between port vi and 
vj, and aij = 0 otherwise. 
2.3 Measuring the weights of container 
shipping routes 
2.3.1 Centralities of ports 
Centrality has already been studied in the 
maritime transportation sector as an indicator for 
assessing the relative importance/position of ports 
as early as in the 1990s (Wang and Cullinane, 
2016). In previous studies, the three most widely 
applied centrality measures in the shipping 
industry include the degree, closeness, and 
betweenness centrality. Centrality indices were 
first developed in social network analysis 
(Newman, 2010) to study the characteristics of 
those crucial nodes within a graph so that the most 
important ones can be identified based on their 
rankings. In this study, only degree centrality of a 
port is considered, which is defined as the number 
of links directly connected to it. Degree centrality 
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2.3.2 Weights of container shipping routes 
From a network perspective, it was revealed that 
the weight of a link is strongly correlated with its 
product degree (Tang and Zhou, 2011), and this 
assumption has been supported by empirical 
evidence of real transportation networks such as 
air networks (Barrat et al., 2004). Without loss of 
generality, it is supposed that a targeted MCTN is 
composed of y shipping routes and the shipping 
route under investigation is composed of x ports. 
Thus, the importance of each container shipping 
route within an MCTN can be assigned as (Holme 
et al., 2002): 
( )( ) ( )ab D DL C a C b
q
=                   (2) 
where  is a tuneable weight parameter (which is 
usually set as 1), and CD(a) and CD(b) are the 
degree of ports a and b (  1, 2,…, x; ) 
respectively. Supposing that cargos are 
transported in a sequence from port a to b, the 
overall importance of the entire shipping route 
can be calculated as the sum of the importance of 
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Therefore, the relative weight of each shipping 
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where, w(c) is the relative weight of shipping 
route c in the MCTN. 
2.4 Assessment of operational risks of MCTNs 
2.4.1 Framework for risk classification in 
maritime container shipping 
Based on a systematic review of previous studies 
(e.g., Ho et al., 2015; Wan et al., 2019) and an in-
depth discussion with domain experts, the 
framework for operational risk classification is 
proposed, as shown in Fig. 2. It is a top-down 
structure framework, which helps to clarify the 
relationships among different risk sources step by 
step. It provides the basis for the identification of 
risk factors. It is composed of three levels (Level 
I, II, and III), in which the bottom level consists 
of all the risk factors identified with respect to 
different aspects of container shipping operations. 
In this study, altogether 26 operational risk factors 
are identified such as information delay, charter 
rates rise, port congestions, and transportation of 
dangerous goods. Refer to Wan et al., (2019) for 
















Fig. 2. Classification of operational risk factors in 
container shipping. 
2.4.2 Assessment of the identified risk factors 
and the risk condition of shipping routes 
In this study, a fuzzy rule-based method is applied 
to model the relationship between antecedents 
(risk parameters such as likelihood and 
consequence) and consequents (risk status). A 
belief rule base (BRB) consists of rules which can 
be used for risk inference, as shown in Eq. (5). 
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where,  is the degree of belief 
(DoB) to which Dj is believed to be the 
consequence in the kth packet rule, when the 
input satisfies the . N is the 
number of all possible consequents. 
In the constructed BRB system, five risk 
parameters are considered as the antecedent 
attributes in fuzzy rules (the IF part). They are risk 
occurrence likelihood (L), visibility (V), 
consequence severity in terms of time 
delay/disruption (CT), additional cost (CC), and 
damage to quality (CQ). Risk status (R) is 
presented as the consequent attribute (the THEN 
part). DoBs are assigned to the linguistic variables 
used to describe the consequent attribute R in the 
BRB. To facilitate subjective data collection and 
representation of judgements associated with the 
five antecedent attributes and conclusion, a set of 
linguistic variables are defined with three levels 
(Alyami et al., 2014). 
This work adopts a proportion method to 
rationalize the distribution of DoB. The weight of 
each risk parameter can be calculated by using the 
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) method 
(Saaty, 1980) based on the evaluations of domain 
experts. Finally, the BRB used in risk assessment 
of MSCs with 243 (35) rules can be developed. 
Once all the required data have been collected and 
prepared, a Bayesian Network (BN) technique is 
applied to conduct risk inference in order to 
overcome the drawbacks of traditional rule 
synthesize methods, including the information 
loss of the fuzzy Min-Max operation. Using a BN 
technique, the BRB can be modelled and 
converted into a converging connection 
consisting of six nodes: five parent nodes, defined 
as NL, NV, NCT, NCC, and NCQ (Nodes L, V, CT, CC 
and CQ); and one child node, defined as NR (Node 
R). Having transferred the BRB into a BN, the 
rule-based risk inference for the risk assessment is 
simplified as the calculation of the marginal 
probability of node NR by using Eq. (6). More 
details are found from Wan et al., (2019) 
3 3 3 3 3
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 (6) 
After each risk factor (in Level III) being assessed, 
their results under each type of flow (in Level II) 
can then be combined by using an evidential 
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reasoning (ER) approach to obtain the risk 
condition of information flows, financial flows, 
and physical flows, respectively. Similarly, the 
results of the risk condition of different flows will 
be further synthesized in order to obtain the 
operational risk condition of the whole shipping 
route. The ER algorithm will be introduced in 
Section 2.5. 
2.5 Evaluation of operational performance of 
MCTNs 
Once the operational risk of shipping routes and 
their relative weights are obtained, the overall 
operational performance of the whole MCTN can 
be calculated by aggregating the risk status of all 
shipping routes within the MCTN by using the ER 
approach, which is illustrated as follows. 
The set S(E) = {(Hn, βn), n = 1, …, N} represents 
a criterion E which is assessed to grade Hn with 
degree of belief βn (n = 1, …, N). Let mn,i be a 
basic probability mass representing the degree to 
which the ith basic criterion ei supports the 
hypothesis that the criterion y is assessed to the 
nth grade Hn. 
To obtain the combined degrees of belief of all the 
basic criteria, EI(i) is firstly defined as the subset 
of the first i basic criteria as follows: 
EI(i) = {e1, e2, …, ei}                 (7) 
Let mn,I(i) be a probability mass defined as the 
degree to which all the i criteria in EI(i) support the 
hypothesis that E is assessed to the grade Hn and 
let mH,I(i) be the remaining probability mass 
unassigned to individual grades after all the basic 
criteria in EI(i) have been assessed. 
mn,I(1) = mn,1, n = 1, 2, ……, N            (8) 
mH,I(1) = mH,1                           (9) 
 
By using Eq. (8) and Eq. (9), Eq. (10) can be 
constructed for i = 1, 2, …, L-1 to obtain the 
coefficients )(, LInm , )(, LIHm  and )(,
~
LIHm  
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KI(i+1) is a normalizing factor. 
{Hn}: 
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The combined DoB of all the basic criteria for 
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Normally, the synthesized results of the 
operational risk of the transport network obtained 
from the aggregating process are presented in the 
form of linguistic terms with their associated 
DoBs. This will hinder the comparison of impacts 
of different shipping routes on the system 
resilience because linguistic terms (e.g., good, 
average, and poor) are not sufficient to show the 
difference between the results. Numerical values, 
therefore, need to be generated from the obtained 
distributed results. 
Suppose the utility of a performance evaluation 
grade of maritime supply network Hn is denoted 
by u(Hn) and u(Hn+1) > u(Hn) if Hn+1 is preferable 
to Hn. u(Hn) can be estimated by the decision 
maker’s preference (Riahi et al., 2012). In this 
research, there are three evaluation grades 
associated with the performance of an MCTN, 
which are Poor, Average, and Good. The utility of 
each evaluation grade is respectively assigned as 
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The utility of the performance of maritime supply 
networks (top-level) E is denoted by u(E), which 
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2.6 Resilience analysis of MCTNs 
After the transformation of the linguistic 
evaluation results into numerical values, 
sensitivity analysis is required to evaluate 
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MCTNs’ resilience by measuring the 
deterioration of the operational performance of 
the system in the face of different disruptions. 
The operational performance of the MCTN under 
normal situation (OPN) can be regarded as a 
baseline, which reflects the risk condition of the 
MCTN during daily operations. Then, the DoBs 
associated with the linguistic term High of a 
shipping route are increased to 100% to check the 
performance of the MCTN under extreme risk 
conditions (OPE). A resilience index (RI) is 
proposed according to the ration between OPN and 
OPE, showing the MCTN’s ability to resist 
external disturbance and maintain the service 









= -                   (19) 
Thus, the higher the value of RI, the better an 
MCTN performs in terms of operational safety. 
3. A numerical study of the Company C 
3.1 Modelling of the container transport 
network of the Company C 
The sample MCTN chosen for illustration in this 
study is from a world leading carrier (refer to as 
“Company C”). The maritime data was sourced 
from the service information of Company C 
published online. The schedule information was 
collected, and basic information of a specific 
route includes ports of call (port rotation), time 
schedule, ship fleet, and ship capacity. A time 
span of two months is considered in this study as 
this time period can cover the longest period a 
voyage may take. By applying the graph of all 
linkages (GAL) representation, each shipping 
route can be interpreted as a small network where 
all ports in the same shipping route are linked 
together, and the merging of all these individual 
sub-networks results in the complete network. 
Based on the information of 123 shipping routes 
in the dataset, an unweighted and directed 
network is constructed composing of 212 nodes 
and 3425 links, as shown in Fig. 3. 
3.2 Operational performance of the Africa 
MCTN 
In this study, the service on Asia/Africa Trade 
Lane offered by the Company C will be taken as 
a case study. The regional MCTN in Africa is 
composed of five major shipping routes, namely, 
FAX route, ASA route, AEF route, ASEA route, 
and FWAS route. There are altogether 36 
container ships serving 41 port pairs, covering the 
eastern, western, and southern Africa. 
 
Fig. 3. Graph of the sample network 
Source: realized by the author based on the service data 
from Company C using the NetDraw software. 
 
First of all, the degree centrality of all ports can 
be obtained based on Eq. (1), and the top three 
ports in terms of degree centrality are Port of 
Shanghai (241), Port of Singapore (230), and Port 
of Ningbo (180). Based on that, the weights of 
each shipping routes can be obtained by using 
Eqs. (2), (3), and (4), as summarized in Table 1.  
Next step is to assess the risk condition of each 
shipping route. Normally, a questionnaire survey 
can be conducted to collect risk assessment 
information on the 26 identified operational risk 
factors with respect to each shipping route, and 
the feedback received from different experts will 
be combined using a weighted average method. 
The estimations of operational risk factors will be 
synthesized to obtain the risk condition of the 
shipping route. Since this work mainly focuses on 
the resilience analysis of MCTNs, here, it is 
assumed that the risk conditions of operations of 
shipping routes under normal situations are as 
follows: 
· FAX: {(Low, 10%), (Medium, 20%), (High, 70%)} 
· ASA: {(Low, 70%), (Medium, 20%), (High, 10%)} 
· AEF: {(Low, 33%), (Medium, 33%), (High, 34%)} 
· ASEA: {(Low, 0%), (Medium, 50%), (High, 50%)} 
· FWAS: {(Low, 50%), (Medium, 50%), (High, 0%)} 
Taking the risk condition of FAX as an example, 
it indicates that its operational risk level is Low 
with a 10% DoB, Medium with a 20% DoB and 
High with a 70% DoB. The OPN of the MCTN can 
be calculated by using Eqs from (7) to (16), which 
is estimated to be {(Poor, 20.0%), (Average, 
35.5%), (Good, 44.5%)}. Its expected value can 
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3.3 Resilience analysis of the Africa MCTN  
In order to analyze the resilience of the Africa 
MCTN, different extreme scenes are set in the 
sensitivity analysis by increasing the DoB 
belonging to the linguistic to 100% with respect 
to different combinations of shipping routes. 
Explanations of different scenarios along with the 
excepted utilities are summarized in Table 2. 
According to Eq. (19), the RI value under 
different risk situations can be obtained. Taking 
FAX as an illustration, the resilience index with 
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It shows that 94.76% of the performance of the 
Africa MCTN remains in terms of the operational 
safety after the disruption of FAX route. 
Similarly, the RI value of other routes can be 
calculated as RIASA = 58.55%, RIAEF = 96.42%, 
RIASEA = 99.93%, and RIFWAS = 40.91%, 
respectively. 





Ports of call 
FAX 0.242 Shanghai-Ningbo-Keelung-Singapore-Durban-Singapore-Shanghai 
ASA 0.254 
Kaohsiung-Xiamen-Hong Kong-Shekou-Singapore-Port Kelang-Durban-Cape Town 
-Port Kelang-Singapore-Kaohsiung 
AEF 0.055 Port-Kelang-Singapore-Colombo-Mombasa-Colombo-Port Kelang 





Table 2. Operational performance of the Africa MCTN under different scenarios 
Normal situation OPN Extreme scenario 1 OPE-FAX 
FAX (0.1, 0.2, 0.7) 
48.250 
FAX (0, 0, 1) 
45.721 
ASA (0.7, 0.2, 0.1) ASA (0.7, 0.2, 0.1) 
AEF (0.33, 0.33, 0.34) AEF (0.33, 0.33, 0.34) 
ASEA (0, 0.5, 0.5) ASEA (0, 0.5, 0.5) 
FWAS (0.5, 0.5, 0) FWAS (0.5, 0.5, 0) 
Extreme scenario 2 OPE-ASA Extreme scenario 3 OPE-AEF 
FAX (0.1, 0.2, 0.7) 
28.252 
FAX (0.1, 0.2, 0.7) 
46.522 
ASA (0, 0, 1) ASA (0.7, 0.2, 0.1) 
AEF (0.33, 0.33, 0.34) AEF (0, 0, 1) 
ASEA (0, 0.5, 0.5) ASEA (0, 0.5, 0.5) 
FWAS (0.5, 0.5, 0) FWAS (0.5, 0.5, 0) 
Extreme scenario 4 OPE-ASEA Extreme scenario 5 OPE-FWAS 
FAX (0.1, 0.2, 0.7) 
48.214 
FAX (0.1, 0.2, 0.7) 
19.738 
ASA (0.7, 0.2, 0.1) ASA (0.7, 0.2, 0.1) 
AEF (0.33, 0.33, 0.34) AEF (0.33, 0.33, 0.34) 
ASEA (0, 0, 1) ASEA (0, 0.5, 0.5) 
FWAS (0.5, 0.5, 0) FWAS (0, 0, 1) 
 
It can be seen that the broken of different shipping 
routes will lead to different degrees of 
deterioration of the MCTN performance, among 
which the shutdown of FWAS route influences 
the most. However, it is also worth noting that the 
whole network still remains an operational 
function of 40.91% even under the most severe 
risk scenario, showing its ability to survive in the 
face of external disturbance. Regarding the 
occurrence of extreme situations on these 
shipping routes in succession, the operational 
performance shows a trend of continuous decline, 
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Fig. 4. Remaining operational performance after the 
disruption of each shipping routes one by one 
as shown in Fig. 4. Finally, the whole MCTN 
almost loses its service functions when all the 
shipping routes are at the highest risk level. 
4. Conclusions 
This work proposes a novel framework 
incorporating different advanced risk modelling 
and assessment techniques in a complementary 
way, to achieve the risk based resilience analysis 
of MCTN from a systematical perspective. 
Although the case study of the proposed model in 
this study focuses on the operational aspects, 
leaving the other risk sources such as managerial, 
natural environment, and political issues to be 
addressed in future work, the proposed method, 
for the first time, reveals the novel and innovative 
idea on comprehensive risk management of 
maritime supply chains by the integration of local 
component level operational risks and systematic 
level safety impacts. The risk-based resilience 
analysis can provide significant insights for the 
development of appropriate risk control options to 
eliminate or mitigate the risk factors in global 
container logistics systems, and to enhance their 
robustness and efficiency. It is also noteworthy 
that the proposed framework provides a standard, 
generic method for the evaluation of MCSC 
performance. Although it is applied and 
demonstrated in a case study of the container 
shipping industry, it has the potential and 
flexibility to be tailored to meet the needs of the 
application in other complex networks such as 
road and rail transportation.  
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